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Abstract
Objective
We explore accurate self-knowledge versus overconfidence in personal intelligence—a “broad”
intelligence about personality. The theory of personal intelligence proposes that people vary in
their ability to understand the traits, goals, plans, and actions of themselves and others. We
wondered who accurately knew that they were higher in personal intelligence and who did not,
and whether individuals with more accurate estimates were distinguishable from others in their
psychological characteristics.
Method
Three archival data sets were identified that included both self-estimates and objective measures
of personal intelligence: The measures were the Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence scale
(SEPI) and the Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI).
Results
People who were over-confident—overestimating their ability-level of personal intelligence—
were positive in their outlook and more sociable. People who provided the most accurate selfestimates were higher in verbal and personal intelligences, more open, and more conscientious
than others.
Conclusions
People who were accurate about themselves have not been studied before in this context but
may, for example, serve as the monitors and thinkers who help keep themselves and others
reasonable and on track.

KEY WORDS: PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE, SELF-KNOWLEDGE, OVERCONFIDENCE,
INTELLIGENCE

1. INTRODUCTION
Evidence indicates that people possess a broad mental ability to problem-solve and reason about
personality that has been termed personal intelligence (named in parallel to social intelligence).
Personal intelligence includes the skills to (a) perceive personality-relevant information, (b)
form accurate models of personality, (c) make good personal choices, and (d) systematize plans
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and goals (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012). We asked who makes accurate estimates of their
personal intelligence and who is over- or underconfident. We believed that more accurate
individuals might be characterized by specific personality characteristics: perhaps they are more
open than others on the Big Five—and therefore more open to watching and evaluating their
own talents.
People who truly understand how skilled they are in understanding themselves and others may
experience advantages relative to individuals who hold misconceptions of their skill: For
example, an unskilled but over-confident individual may regularly misjudge themselves and
others, and act on this erroneous information to both their own and others’ detriment. Studies of
self-insight indicate that inaccurate self-knowledge is prevalent: Sixty-five percent of
Americans regard themselves as above average in general intelligence (Heck, Simons, &
Chabris, 2018). Such inaccuracy is reflected as well in the correlation between self-estimated
and objectively-assessed general intelligence of r = .29 (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998; Zell &
Krizan, 2014). Regarding personal intelligence more specifically, self-estimates and ability
exhibit a parallel pattern, correlating between r = .10 to .28 (e.g., Mayer, Lortie, Panter, &
Caruso, 2018). It seems likely that people who are overconfident in their personal intelligence,
or who are underconfident, would be misguided by such erroneous estimates of their skills,
leading to problematic interpersonal behavior (Mayer et al., 2018; Mayer & Skimmyhorn,
2017).
Prior studies of self-estimated general intelligence looked at the relation between such selfestimates and other variables such as the Big Five; those studies have found that higher selfestimates are related to positive affect (Storek & Furnham, 2013). But these results were
obtained without adjusting the self-estimates for actual intelligence. In the present work we
focus on self-estimates in relation to actual ability: That is, whether people, over- or
underestimate their abilities, and the overall accuracy of their self-estimates relative to objective
tests (cf. He & Côté, 2019; Zell & Krizan, 2014 for similar approaches). Self-estimates also can
be compared to observer judgments (Kenny & Albright, 1987; Leising, Locke, Kurzius, &
Zimmermann, 2016) although we do not study that here.
Adjusting self-estimates using actual ability adds an additional level of understanding to
research in the area. Two people, A and B, for example, may have similar, above-average selfestimates, as indicated in the “self-estimate” boxes in Figure 1. It may turn out, however, that
Person A (Figure 1, left) is low in actual ability—and quite overconfident in their self-estimate.
By comparison, Person B (right), who expressed the same above-average estimate, may be
unconfident in their estimate in that they are quite high in personal intelligence. In neither case
are the two people accurate estimators.
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1.1 Personal intelligence, its estimation and measure
Personal intelligence as an ability can be regarded as located within the three-stratum, or
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model, a model of mental ability employed regularly by
intelligence researchers (McGrew, 2009). The CHC model arranges intelligences in a hierarchy,
with general intelligence—g—at the top, and beneath g at a second tier, broad intelligences such
as verbal, quantitative, spatial, and auditory. These broad intelligences also include peoplecentered intelligences such as ability-measured emotional intelligence (MacCann, Joseph,
Newman, & Roberts, 2014), and also, we believe, personal intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, &
Salovey, 2016). The last stratum of the intelligence model contains individual ability tasks that
serve as indicators of the broad intelligences.
The Test of Personal Intelligence can be regarded as assessing a single, unified ability, as
supported by confirmatory factor analyses over six samples and four test forms collectively
including 20,000-plus participants (Mayer, Caruso, et al., 2019). High scorers on the TOPI
exhibit less problematic behavior at work, r = -.21, including less sabotage and fewer thefts than
others, even after controlling for verbal intelligence (Mayer et al., 2018). TOPI scores also
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predict college students’ GPAs in people-centered courses such as English and Leadership and
less-so for thing-focused courses such as engineering and chemistry (e.g., r = .22 versus .12,
both ps < .01), replicated across two samples; these relations remain significant even after
controlling for spatial intelligence, and verbal and math SATs (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017).
Personal intelligence correlates between r = .15 and .35 with such broad intelligences as
Quantitative, Spatial, and Verbal intelligences, and more highly with emotional intelligence (as
an ability) at r = .68. Yet personal intelligence is distinct, for example, in being the only known
broad intelligence that regularly correlates with Big Five conscientiousness (e.g., Mayer et al.,
2012; Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017).
1.1.1. The Objective Measure of Personal Intelligence
The aforementioned Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI, e.g., Mayer, Caruso, et al., 2019;
Mayer et al., 2012) comes in several forms, all of which consist of multiple-choice items with a
single correct answer among four choices. For example, a question might ask: A person is
straightforward and modest. Most likely, she also could be described as: (a) Valuing ideas and
beliefs, (b) Active and full of energy, (c) Sympathetic to others and “tender minded”, or (d)
Self-conscious and more anxious than average (Mayer et al., 2012). The answer to this sample
question is “(c) Sympathetic to others and ‘tender minded’”, because research indicates that the
descriptors “straightforward” “sympathetic” and “tender minded” fall on an Honesty/Humility
factor assessed in the HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 2010). Correct answers receive a score
of 1 point; the rest, 0.
1.1.2 Self-Estimates of Personal Intelligence
People also can be asked how highly they estimate their own personal intelligence, employing
the Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence (SEPI) scale. On that scale, participants respond to
such items as, “I understand who I am,” “I read people’s intentions well”, and “I am a good
judge of character” on a five point scale from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to Strongly Agree (5)
(Mayer et al., 2018). Participants who take the scale generally exhibit a “better than average”
effect (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), responding to the foregoing items with roughly a four out of
five on the scale.
1.2 The present research
Here, we examine both people’s accuracy at estimating their ability at personal intelligence and
their under- or overconfidence in their skills relative to that ability. We then go on to examine
whether their accuracy and over-versus-underconfidence are part of a broader picture of their
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personalities.1 Understanding who is accurate and who is prone to overconfidence has realworld implications. For example, in the workplace, an overconfident manager may initially be
attractive to employees and to an organization and favored relative to colleagues who are more
self-critical (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2010; Giacomin & Jordan, 2018; Grijalva, Harms,
Newman, Gaddis, & Fraley, 2015). People prefer confident-appearing supervisors even after
they have made errors in judgment such as who to hire or whether a team-member can handle
an assignment properly (Tenney, Meikle, Hunsaker, Moore, & Anderson, 2019). Indeed,
overconfident managers may make decisions that are overly-risky and exploitive-of-others
(Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005).
1.2.1 Similarities and differences with other intelligences.
Although we focus on the construct of personal intelligence and its relation with personality and
people-related variables, our findings also may be generalizable at least in part to other broad
intelligences (and perhaps g). For example, people who are overconfident in their ability, like
people with higher self-estimates more generally, are likely to be higher in Big Five dimensions
related to positive affect (compare, for example, He & Côté, 2019). That said, people’s
overconfidence and accuracy in relation to their understanding of personality (personal
intelligence), relative to other intelligences, may have consequential outcomes unique to
people’s interpersonal relations.
1.3 Data analytic strategies
As noted already, accuracy, as we operationalize it in this research, is the absolute difference
between a self-estimate (i.e., the SEPI) and actual intelligence (i.e., the TOPI). Overconfidence
is the difference between the two test scores, taking into account the direction of the
discrepancy; that is, whether the self-estimated (SEPI) score exceeds or falls short of one’s
actual personal intelligence (TOPI) score.
In this article we adjust self-estimates according to a person’s actual ability using two methods:
difference and residual scores, owing to the important information such composites potentially
provide. The use of both difference and residual score adjustments provide complementary
views of the same data.
Psychologists often are warned that difference scores can be highly unreliable and residual
scores are incomplete in making adjustments to measures (Edwards, 2001; Krueger, Heck, &
Asendorpf, 2017; Trafimow, 2015). We proceed carefully through this territory, conducting
1

We sometimes will use “overconfidence” as shorthand for “over-versus-underconfidence” in this article.

WHEN PEOPLE ESTIMATE THEIR PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE

7

ancillary analyses, several of which are reported in detail in the Technical Supplement (Mayer,
Panter, & Caruso, 2020), including an assessment of our scores via polynomial regression with
response surface analysis (RSA, e.g., Edwards, 2002; He & Côté, 2019), and a check of the
potential use of accuracy scores in regression analyses. We also check for interactions between
the SEPI and TOPI (e.g., Zuckerman, Gagné, Nafshi, Knee, & Kieffer, 2002).
2. A REANALYSIS OF THREE STUDIES
2.1 identification of archival samples
To examine people’s accuracy and overconfidence, we drew on three archived data sets, each of
which had included a form of the SEPI (self-estimated personal intelligence) and a TOPI (actual
personal intelligence). For convenience, we refer to the three data sets as Studies 1, 2, and 3,
and they involved, respectively, N = 381 college students, and N = 394 and 482 employees
recruited through Mturk over two successive years. At their times of collection, the the study
procedures all had been approved by the University of New Hampshire’s Institutional Review
Board for the Ethical Treatment of Human Subjects, and all participants indicated their consent.
The Study 1 data are unpublished; data from Studies 2 and 3 were previously reported (Mayer et
al., 2018): This, however, is the first report of accuracy and overconfidence of personal
intelligence in any study.
All three studies employed the SEPI-16, a 16-item form version of the SEPI. Studies 1 and 2
used a TOPI short form, the TOPI-MINI (12-items); Study 3 included a 67-item version of the
TOPI (the TOPI 4R, Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2017). Studies 1 and 3 included measures of the
Big Five; Studies 2 and 3 included measures of workplace variables and verbal intelligence.
2.2 Common hypotheses
All three hypotheses were a priori except where noted. Post-hoc tests are reported in a section
after the tests of hypothesis entitled “Supplemental Analyses.”
Hypothesis 1: Scores on self-estimated (the SEPI) and actual personal intelligence (TOPI)
will be commensurate with past findings using those scales.
To check the integrity of our three archival datasets, we hypothesized that the relations among
the key variables should echo findings from other research: The SEPI and TOPI should
correlate with one another between r = .10 to .25; the SEPI between r = .40 to .60 with the Big
Five’s “socio-affective three” (Saucier, 1992) of extraversion, agreeableness and (low)
neuroticism; and, the TOPI at lower levels, r = .10 to .24, with the Big Five’s scales of
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agreeableness, openness and conscientiousness (Mayer et al., 2012; Mayer & Skimmyhorn,
2017).
Hypothesis 2: People who are overconfident relative to their actual level of personal
intelligence will be higher on measures related to positive affect.
Overconfidence scores—self-estimates adjusted for actual intelligence—we believed, also will
relate r = .30 or higher with the Big Five socio-affective traits of extraversion, agreeableness
and (low) neuroticism collected in Studies 1 and 3; and, in Studies 2 and 3, measures of
perceived social support, work satisfaction, and core self-evaluation.
Hypothesis 3: People who are more accurate in their self-estimates will exhibit higher
personal intelligence, openness to experience, and additional traits across studies.
Our a priori hypotheses were that (a) people with greater personal intelligence would be more
accurate in their self-estimates of themselves for the simple reason that they understand more
about their own and others’ personalities, and (b) people who scored higher on Big Five
Openness would be more accurate, as they would be less defensive about their level of ability.
After examining the results from Study 1, we added to our hypotheses also that (c) people’s
levels of verbal intelligence and conscientiousness would positively predict accuracy.
Finally, we checked for significant interactions between self-estimates and ability
measures of personal intelligence. Further supplemental analyses also will be reported.
2.2.1 Issues of sample size and power
Our Ns across three studies ranged from 381 to 492, and we often will discuss effect sizes from
r = .10 to .30. A sample size of 347 is sufficient to determine that a correlation of r = .15 is
statistically significantly different from zero at the .05 level, with false negatives (non-rejections
of the null hypothesis, a.k.a. Type 2 errors) occurring 20% of the time (Hulley, Cummings,
Browner, Grady, & Newman, 2013; Kohn, Jarrett, & Senyak, 2018). The individual studies
have sufficiently large N to often detect all but the weakest effects we are anticipating.
2.2.2 Open source data and Technical Supplement.
The de-identified data for key variables employed in these studies, and a technical supplement
containing more details of our analyses are provided in an open-source repository (Mayer,
Panter et al., 2020).

WHEN PEOPLE ESTIMATE THEIR PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE

3. ARCHIVAL STUDY METHODS
3.1 Samples
All three samples initially were screened for incomplete responses, too-quick responding,
attention check items, and the like. The final sample sizes of Studies 1, 2, and 3 were N = 347,
394, and 482, respectively post-screening. All participants were 18 years of age or older. Study
1 was drawn from a university subject pool of college students; Studies 2 and 3 from people
employed more than 35 hours/week, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The mean age of participants in Study 1 was 19.7 years (range 18 to 48 years), including 97
men and 250 women, of whom 328 identified as White/Caucasian with the next-largest groups
identifying as African/American (12), Asian/Pacific Islander (9), Hispanic (9), and smaller
groups. Details of the samples in Studies 2 and 3 are in the original report (Mayer et al., 2018).
3.2 Measures
The relevant measures across the three studies were divided into groups of (a) actual and selfestimated personal intelligence; (b) socio-affective style drawn mostly from the Big Five
measures; (c) intellectual style and self-control from the Big Five, and (d) measures of
workplace perception and behavior. Study 1 employed the Big Five, Study 2 employed
measures of workplace behavior and attitudes, and Study 3 contained measures of both kinds.
3.2.1 Measures of Actual and Self-Estimated Intelligence.
The Test of Personal Intelligence, MINI-12 and Version 4R (TOPI-MINI-12 and TOPI 4R)
To test actual problem-solving about personality, we used the Test of Personal Intelligence,
TOPI MINI-12, in Studies 1 and 2 and TOPI 4R in Study 3. The MINI-12 is a 12-item IRTinformed version of the TOPI that selected 12 especially high-performing test items to
represent a single, overall TOPI ability score (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2019). The full-length
TOPI 4R, is a 67-item version (Mayer et al., 2017). Adjusted for unreliability, the two TOPI
versions correlate about r = .94, r = .78 pre-adjustment (Mayer, Panter, et al., 2019).
The Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence-16 items (SEPI-16)
The SEPI-16 is a 16-item short form of the original 120-item SEPI (the complete scale was
administered in Study 1). The SEPI-16 is reported for all three studies here; it exhibits
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reliabilities of approximately r = .90 (Mayer et al., 2017) and yields a single score of selfestimated personal intelligence.
Wordsumplus
Wordsumplus is a 16-item IRT-refined vocabulary scale that served as an index of verbal
intelligence in Studies 2 and 3 (Cor, Haertel, Krosnick, & Malhotra, 2012).
3.2.2 Measures of socioemotional style
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness scales of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-44, 44
items total, John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) were used to index socio-emotional style in Study
1. For reasons of time, Study 3 employed the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), a measure
of the Big Five with subscales of 2-items each. The TIPI exhibits reasonable validity despite its
brevity and below-par reliabilities (Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).
The Core Self-Evaluation Scale (CSES) also was included in Study 3 as a measure of selfesteem and self-efficacy at work (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003). Scales of Social
Support and Job Satisfaction (described under “Measures of Workplace Perception and
Behavior”) also can be regarded as indices of positivity.
3.2.3 Measures of self-control and intellectual style.
Measures of self-control and intellectual style were indexed by the Big Five scales of
Conscientiousness and Openness from the BFI-44 in Study 1 and from the TIPI in Study 3.
3.2.4 measures of workplace perception and behavior
Measures of workplace behavior and attitudes were included in Studies 2 and 3 including (a)
Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), a checklist of pro-social helping behaviors at work
(e.g., helping a coworker with a project), and (b) Counterproductive Work Behavior (CWB), a
checklist of behaviors of sabotage, theft, undermining coworkers, and similar activities at work
(Fox, Spector, Goh, Bruursema, & Kessler, 2012; Spector et al., 2006), as well as the Social
Support scale from the Work Design Questionnaire (friendliness and kindness at work, 6-items),
and a 3-item Job Satisfaction Scale which measured satisfaction with a current job, both from
Bowling and Hammond (2008).
3.3 Calculation of Accuracy and Overconfidence Scores
We used two standard approaches to calculate accuracy and overconfidence scores: difference
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in Z scores, and residualized scores.
3.3.1 Accuracy as Difference-in-Z-Scores (DIZs)
Recall that self-estimated personal intelligence is measured here with the Self-Estimated
Personal Intelligence (SEPI) measure; actual personal intelligence with the Test of Personal
Intelligence (TOPI). The difference scores for accuracy were created by (1) converting the SEPI
and TOPI scores to z-scores; (2) subtracting the self-estimated z-score from the actual personal
intelligence z-score and, last, (3) taking the absolute value, i.e., DIZaccr = |zXestm – zXablty|. Finally,
for ease of interpretation (4) we converted the score from a measure of discrepancy to one of
accuracy by reversing its sign and then converting it to a T-scale (M = 50, S = 10).
3.3.2 Accuracy as Residual Scores
To create the residual accuracy scores, we (1) used the person’s actual TOPI ability level; and
(2) subtracted from their ability score the regression-estimated ability scores they ought to have,
given their level of confidence (based on the sample’s overall behavior). Thus, we began with
the z-scores of the TOPI and SEPI, regressed the z-scored TOPI against the SEPI, and took the
residual scores.2 Finally, the residual scores were reversed in sign and converted to a T-scale.
3.3.3 Overconfidence (and underconfidence) as Difference in z-scores (DIZs)
To create the overconfidence DIZs, we first converted the SEPI and TOPI to z-scores. Next, we
took the SEPI (zXestm) and subtracted the TOPI (zXablty) from it to get the difference; that is,
DIZconf = zXestm – zXablty. These DIZ scores then were converted to a T-scale (M = 50, S = 10) for
comparison across studies.
3.3. 4 Overconfidence (and Underconfidence) as Residual scores
To create the overconfidence residual scores, we began with the person’s self-estimates on the
SEPI (their simple confidence unadjusted for ability), subtracted the self-estimated level they
“ought” to have given their ability score (on the TOPI), based on the sample’s overall behavior,
and converted those to a T scale. More specifically, we again used the z-scores of the TOPI and
the SEPI measures (zXablty and zŶestm, where the ŷ was predicted). We regressed the SEPI on the
TOPI to obtain the resulting residual scores of the regression.3 The regression scores represent

2
3

Mathematically, zYablty on zXestm yields ŷablty, and then residaccr = |yablty - ŷablty|.
Mathematically, zYconf on zXestm yields ŷconf, and then residconf = yconf – ŷconf.
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people’s self-estimated PI adjusted by the self-estimate of people-in-general with the same
TOPI ability level, to yield an overconfidence score.
For both DIZ and regression overconfidence scores higher scores represented greater
overconfidence; lower scores represented underconfidence.

4. RESULTS
4.1 General Checks
The classes of variables used in these studies are shown in Table 1’s spanner rows, with the
specific measures in the left-hand column: the (a) Basic Scores included the TOPI, SEPI, and
vocabulary scores (i.e., Wordsumplus); (b) the Accuracy-Adjusted Scores: our indices of selfinsight and over-under confidence, assessed both as DIZ and residual scores. And the three sets
of criterion variables: (c) the Big Five Socio-Affective traits (Saucier, 1992), (d) Self-Control
and Intellectual Style traits, and (e) Work Perception and Behavior Variables.
The means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of the measures are indicated under the study
columns. The difference and residual score reliabilities range from r = .64 to .86, with all but
one above r = .70, calculated following Linn and Slinde (1977, formulae 2 and 5).
In Studies 1 and 3, women exhibited both higher personal intelligence and higher estimates of
their personal intelligence than men (about .25 SDs); there were no differences in Study 2, and
no consistent differences for accuracy or overconfidence scores in any study. More detail about
these analyses are given in the Technical Supplement.
4.2 The basic scores and accuracy-adjusted scores and their attributes
The top portion of Table 2 indicates the correlations among the ability measure of personal
intelligence (i.e., TOPI), self-estimated personal intelligence (i.e., SEPI) and the indices of
accuracy and confidence (i.e., DIZs and residuals), these all are considered next.
4.2.1 The basic scores
The TOPI ability score and SEPI self-estimated scores correlated between r = .06 and .28 across
studies. The Study 1 value of r = .06 was lower than our predicted range of r = .10 to .25, Study
2 was at the lower end of the range, and Study 3, at r = .28 was a bit higher than our
hypothesized upper limit. There were no outliers or other aberrant qualities of the scatterplots
for any of the studies (scatterplots in the Technical Supplement).
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TABLE 1
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND RELIABILITIES FOR THE CENTRAL
MEASURES OF THE ANALYSES ACROSS STUDIES 1, 2 AND 3

M

TOPI-MINI
TOPI-4R
SEPI
WORDSUMPLUS

.83
-3.63
--

Accuracy-DIZS
Accuracy-Resids.
Confidence-DIZS
Confidence-Resids.

50
50
50
50

Extraversion
Neuroticism
Agreeableness

3.44
3.13
3.81

Conscientiousness
Openness

3.57
3.51

Organ. Citiz. Beh.
Cntprdct. Work Beh.
Work Soc. Support
Job Satisfaction

-----

Study 1
S
Rel.

Study 2
Study 3
S
Rel.
M
S
Rel.
Basic Scores
Actual and Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence and Vocabulary
.87
.15
.16
.64
.71
---49.23
10.90
-----.94
3.6
.56
3.88
.63
.45
.83
.89
.95
10.63 2.47
10.35
2.49
--.73
.73
Accuracy-Adjusted Scores
Difference and Residual Indices of Accuracy and Confidencea,b
10
.72
50
10
.74
50
10
.92
10
.64
50
10
.71
50
10
.93
10
.72
50
10
.74
50
10
.92
10
.86
50
10
.89
50
10
.94
Criterion Measures
Big Five—Socio-Affective Traitsc
3.93
1.65
.77
.87
---.76
2.79
1.45
.71
.81
---.74
5.55
1.25
.58
.77
---.58
Big Five-Self Control and Intellectual Stylec
5.68
1.18
.57
.78
---.63
5.17
1.29
.54
.75
---.55
Work Perception and Behavior Variables
--2.9
.68
.92
2.92
.66
.92
--1.3
.30
.90
1.24
.30
.93
--3.8
.65
.92
3.90
.63
.80
--5.3
1.5
.79
5.31
1.55
.94
M

Notes: a. Reliabilities for difference and residual scores are estimated from Linn and Slinde (1977, formulae 2 and 5); b.
Difference and residual scores have been converted to T-scores (i.e., M = 50, S =10). c. Note: The difference in mean
item response between the two Big Five scales (Study 1 versus Study 3) are due, in part to the different response scales:
The BFI-44 uses a 5-point scale, the TIPI uses a 7-point scale.

4.2.2. The accuracy scores
The accuracy-adjusted scores represented the degree to which people’s self-estimates of
personal intelligence matched their objectively-measured personal intelligence; these also are
indicated in Table 1. The DIZ and residual scores for accuracy correlated with one another r =
.59, .39 and .58 across Studies 1, 2 and 3, ps < .001, indicating that they shared moderate
common variance with each other.
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TABLE 2
RELATIONS AMONG MEASURES OF ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THEIR CONGRUENCE ACROSS STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3
BASIC SCORES
ACCURACY-ADJUSTED SCORES

SEPI
STUDY 1

STUDY 2

STUDY 3

SEPI
TOPI-MINI
Accuracy-DIZs
Accuracy-Resids
Confidence-DIZs
Confidence-Resids
SEPI
TOPI-MINI
Accuracy-DIZs
Accuracy-Resids
Confidence-DIZs
Confidence-Resids
SEPI
TOPI 4R
Accuracy-DIZs
Accuracy-Resids
Confidence-DIZs
Confidence-Resids

1.00
.06
.12*
.15**
.69***
.99***a
1.00
.11*
.20***
.12*
.67***
.99***
1.00
.28***
.33***
.34***
.60***
.96***

TOPI-4R

Indices of Accuracy

Indices of Over-Conf.

(absolute differences)

(directional differences)

DIZs

DIZs

Residuals

Residuals

1.00
.38**
.62***
-.68***
.00

1.00
.59***
-.19***
.10

1.00
-.35***
.11*

1.00
.73***

1.00

1.00
.45***
.70***
-.67***
.00

1.00
.39***
-.20***
.15**

1.00
-.44***
.04

1.00
.74***

1.00

1.00
.19***
.49***
-.60***
.00

1.00
.58***
.12**
.29***

1.00
-.13***
.21***

1.00
.80***

1.00

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001, two-tailed tests.
a. .998 to three decimals, unrounded in the table to indicate the slight departure from 1.0. All other values have been rounded to two
decimals.

4.2.3 Response surface analyses of accuracy scores
We further conducted polynomial regression with response surface analysis (RSAs, e.g.,
Humberg, Nestler, & Back, 2019) for both the DIZ and Residual accuracy scores for all three
studies (Figure 2). The technique permits a three-dimensional visualization of the level of the
accuracy scores (z-axis) and their change across levels of the TOPI (x-axis) and SEPI (y-axis).
The classic parafoil shape of the surfaces (left hand column of Figure 2) exhibit a near-perfect
representation of correspondence between the TOPI and SEPI. The residual scores to the right
exhibit a similar pattern, but are rotated and slightly flatter, representing a relative
undercorrection of the scores, an oft-noted aspect of the residual approach.
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4.2.4 The overconfidence scores
The correlations for the overconfidence DIZ and residuals scores across the three studies were r
= .73, .74, and .80, ps < .001, indicating greater similarity across calculation methods than had
been the case for accuracy. It also is worth noting that the overconfidence scores calculated via
regression were very close to the basic SEPI scores across studies (rs = .99, .99, and .96; see
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Table 2) due to the very low correlation of the TOPI with the SEPI, a further sign of the
undercorrection (Krueger et al., 2017). The inclusion of the regression scores reflects a
preference of some data analysts for that approach (Robins & John, 1997), and these scores may
be unique contributors in regression formulae, as indicated later.
Having considered the relations among the basic and accuracy-adjusted scores, we move next to
hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis 1: Known relations among the TOPI, SEPI and other measures will be
similar to those obtained in the past.
As already noted, the TOPI and SEPI measures correlated with one another near or within our
estimated range of r = .10 to .25 (see Table 2, middle rows). In Studies 2 and 3, the TOPI
correlated with WordSumPlus (verbal intelligence) at r = .46 and .49, p < .001, a bit higher than
in the past.
Also as found in the past, people who self-estimated their personal intelligence to be high (i.e.,
higher SEPI scores) also exhibited higher scores on Extraversion and Agreeableness, and
(lower) Neuroticism on the Big Five, between r = .30 and .39 in Study 1 and .29 to .48 in Study
3, with Neuroticism reversed. SEPI scores also correlated higher with the Core Self Evaluation
measure in Study 3, r = .64. Looking at the affect-related workplace variables in Studies 2 and 3
(found in Table 4), the SEPI correlated with perceived social support and job satisfaction, r =
.27 and .26 in Study 2 and r = .33 and .28 in Study 3, ps < .001.
Regarding actual personal intelligence, TOPI scores correlated in the right direction but nonsignificantly with Agreeableness, Openness and Conscientiousness, r = .09, .09 and .10 in Study
1, n.s., and significantly, r = .18, .20, and .17 in Study 3, ps < .001 relative to our predictions of
from r = .10 to .24 (Mayer et al., 2012; Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017).
Hypothesis 2: People who were overconfident about their personal intelligence
were higher on measures related to positive affect.
People who exhibited overconfidence also showed more positive affect, indexed again on the
Big Five by Extraversion, Agreeableness, and (lower) Neuroticism. This effect held for both
DIZ and residual scores. In Study 1, for example, Extraversion correlated with the
overconfidence scores rDIZ = .24 and rresid = .38, ps < .001; Agreeableness values were rDIZ = .19
and rresid = .35, ps < .001, and Neuroticism, rDIZ = -.24 and rresid = -.30, ps < .001. The pattern
repeated in Study 3 (Table 3).
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TABLE 3
RELATION OF PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCURACY, AND OVERCONFIDENCE TO
GENERAL PERSONALITY MEASURES ACROSS STUDIES
BASIC SCORES
ACCURACY-ADJUSTED SCORES
Variable
SEPI and TOPI
Indices of Accuracy
Indices of Over-Confidence
Pearson Correlations
(absolute differences)
(directional differences)
e
SEPI
TOPI
Abs. Diff.
Residual Difference Residual
in z-scoresa scoresb
in z-scoresc scoresd
STUDY 1

Socio-affective traits
Extraversion
.39***
.05
.06
.04
.24***
Agreeableness
.34***
.09
.11*
.17***
.19***
Neuroticism
-.30***
.02
-.04
-.01
-.24***
Intelligence, intellectual style, and self-control traits
TOPI-MINI
.06
1.00
.38***
.62***
-.68***
Openness
.20***
.09
.09
.15**
.08
Conscient.
.45***
.10
.15***
.20***
.25***
STUDY 2
Intelligence traits
TOPI-MINI
.11*
1.00
.45***
.70***
-.67***
WordSumPlus
-.05
.46*** .14**
.32**
-.38**
STUDY 3
Socio-affective traits
Extraversion
.29***
-.04
.06
.06
.28***
Agreeableness
.37***
.18*** .05
.16**
.16***
Neuroticism
-.48***
-.03
-.21***
-.17***
-.38***
Core Self.64***
.08
.21***
.21***
.47***
Evaluation
Intelligence, intellectual style, and self-control traits
TOPI-4R
.28***
1.00
.19***
.49***
-.60***
WordSumPlus
.10*
.49*** .09*
.16***
-.33**
Openness
.35***
.20*** .04
.18***
.13**
Conscient.
.58***
.17*** .19***
.23***
.34***

.38***
.35***
-.30***
.00
.20***
.44***
.00
-.10
.31***
.34***
-.49***
.64***
.00
-.04
.30***
.55***

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001, two tailed tests.
a
Based on the absolute value of the difference of the z-scores on the TOPI minus the z-scores on the SEPI. Scores are transformed
to a T-scale such that greater scores equal more accuracy.
b
Based on absolute value of residual scores from TOPI (ŷ) regressed on the SEPI(x). Scores are transformed to a T-scale such that
greater scores equal more accuracy.
c
Based on the directional value of the difference of the z-scores on the SEPI minus the z-scores on the TOPI. Higher scores
represent more confidence.
d
Directional value of the residual from the SEPI (ŷ) regressed on the TOPI (x). Higher scores represent more confidence.
e
The TOPI MINI in Study 2; the TOPI 4R in Study 3.

In addition, overconfident individuals perceived that they had more social support and selfreported greater job satisfaction, using both DIZ and residual scores in most instances: for social
support in Study 2, rDIZ = .06, n.s., and rresid = .25, p < .001; for job satisfaction, rDIZ = .23 and
rresid =.27, ps < .001 (see Table 4, Study 2 and Study 3 rows). In Study 3, the relations were
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equivalent or stronger.
TABLE 4
RELATION OF ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE TO INDICIES OF
WORKPLACE PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR (STUDIES 2 AND 3)
BASIC SCORES
ACCURACY-ADJUSTED SCORES
Variable
SEPI and TOPI
Indices of Accuracy
Indices of Over-Confidence
Pearson Correlations (absolute differences)
(directional differences)
SEPI
TOPIe
Abs. Diff.
Residual Difference Residual
in z-scoresa scoresb
in z-scoresc scoresd
STUDY 2 Org. Cit. Beh.
.18***
.03
.01
.05
.11*
.17***
Countprdct.
-.25*** -.19***
-.10*
-.22*** -.05
-.24***
Work Bhvr
Soc. Support
.27***
.19***
.08
.15**
.06
.25***
Job Satisfact.
.26*** -.06
.01
-.01
.23***
.27***
Job Income.
.17*** -.07
-.03
-.12**
.18***
.18
STUDY 3 Org. Cit. Beh.
Countprdct.
Work Bhvr
Soc. Support
Job Satisfact.
Job Income.

.17***
-.25***

-.06
-.24***

.33***
.28***
.06

.15***
.06
-.03

.01
-.05
.03
.09*
.00

-.08
-.26***
.10*
.08
-.04

.19***
-.01

.19***
-.19***

.15***
.18***
.08

.30***
.27***
.07

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001, two-tailed tests.
a
Based on the absolute value of the difference of the z-scores on the TOPI minus the z-scores on the SEPI. Scores are transformed
to a T-scale such that greater scores equal more accuracy.
b
Based on absolute value of residual scores from TOPI (ŷ) regressed on the SEPI(x). Scores are transformed to a T-scale such that
greater scores equal more accuracy.
c
Based on the directional value of the difference of the z-scores on the SEPI minus the z-scores on the TOPI. Higher scores
represent more confidence.
d
Directional value of the residual from the SEPI (ŷ) regressed on the TOPI (x). Higher scores represent more confidence.
e
The TOPI MINI in Study 2; the TOPI 4R in Study 3.

Hypothesis 3: People who are more accurate in their self-estimates will exhibit
higher personal intelligence, openness, and additional traits consistently across studies.
People with higher personal intelligence were more accurate in their self-estimates of their
personal intelligence across the three studies: The Study 1 correlations between the TOPI and
accuracy scores were rDIZ = .38 and rresid = .62, ps < .01; the remaining values for Studies 2 and
3 are consistent (Table 2, lower rows). Because the accuracy score “contains” the TOPI score in
it, perhaps this is insufficiently compelling by itself—but Studies 2 and 3 exhibited the same
effects for verbal intelligence: WordSumPlus correlated with accuracy in Studies 2 and 3, for
Study 2, rDIZ = .14, and rresid = .32, ps < .01 and < .001; and for Study 3, rDIZs = .09, rresid = .16,
ps < .05 and .001, respectively (Table 3).
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Dunning-Kruger Effects
The above findings suggested a Dunning-Kruger effect might be present (Kruger & Dunning,
1999): i.e., that people in the lowest quartile of ability were most overconfident. Indeed, that
was the case across all three studies. For Study 3, for example, mean overconfidence of each
quartile were MQ1= 59.21, MQ2 = 50.34, MQ3 = 46.94, and MQ4 = 43.36), all groups different, p <
.05, by Tukey’s HSD. The effect is graphed in Figure 3, and more detail is available in the
Technical Supplement.
Returning to our a priori hypotheses, accurate self-estimates exhibited a trend toward
correlating with Openness: In Study 1, rDIZ = .09, n.s., and rresid = .15, p < .01; in Study 3, rDIZs =
.05, n.s., and rresid = .18, p < .001, But a stronger and unpredicted relation was that more
accurate people also were more conscientiousness, in Study 1 rDIZ = .15 and rresid = .20, ps <
.01; in Study 3, rDIZs = .19, rresid = .23, ps < .001.

Applying RSA to findings regarding vocabulary and conscientiousness.
We note that applying polynomial regression with RSA to vocabulary and Conscientiousness
failed to find the same result (analyses in the Technical Supplement). We were, however, able
to sort out the practical contribution of the above findings using regression analyses described
shortly.
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Although not predicted among the workplace behavior measures, Counterproductive Work
Behavior was associated with lower accuracy in both studies 2 and 3; in Study 2 for example,
rDIZ = -.10, and rresid = -.22, ps < .05 and < .001.
4.2.5 Were there interactions?
We further examined interactions between the SEPI and TOPI in predicting Organizational
Citizenship Behavior, Social Support, and Counterproductive Work Behavior, as well as with
the Big Five. Of these tests, the only consistent interaction across studies was for
Counterproductive Work Behavior.

The interaction in Study 2 for Counterproductive Work Behavior was R2change = .012 F(1, 389) =
5.418, p < .02; the overall model (TOPI, SEPI, and interaction) was R2 = .104, F(3, 389) =
15.01, p < .001. That for Study 3 yielded a full model R2 = .118, p < .001, and the interaction
R2change = .024, F(1, 478) = 13.01, p < .001.
Graphing the interactions (Figure 4, Studies 2 and 3) illustrated the main effects that, first,
employees who have lower personal intelligence scores engaged in more counterproductive
work behavior (x-axis, left-versus-righthand side); and second, that people who were lower in
self-estimated PI similarly engaged in such CWB (the low SEPI line at the top). The interaction,
in turn, indicated that low confidence in combination with low actual PI resulted in a greater
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likelihood of such counterproductive behavior than either low confidence or low ability alone: a
scatterplot indicates the effect (see also the Technical Supplement section on the interactions).
5. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
One possible reservation concerning our findings was whether they make a practical difference
in regard to predictions of criterion variables. We therefore conducted a series of regressions
predicting all our criterion measures, comparing regression models that included only the TOPI,
SEPI, and their interaction, with regressions that substituted accuracy scores for the interaction
term (to keep the number of predictors constant). The use of logically-derived accuracy
scores—especially the model employing residual scores—performed as well and perhaps a bit
better than the standard model for several criteria including conscientiousness, vocabulary,
Counterproductive Work Behavior, And Organizational Citizenship, with details in the
Technical Supplement.
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
6.1 Recapitulation of purpose and summary of results
6.1.1. Accuracy and confidence scores
In this article we focused on people who self-estimate their personal intelligence accurately and
people who do not, as well as on people who are over- or underconfident in their self-estimates.
Following best practices in this area, both our overconfidence and the accuracy scores were
calculated in two recommended fashions, as difference and as residual scores (Krueger et al.,
2017; Robins & John, 1997). Polynomial regression with response surface analysis (RSA) also
was employed.
We constructed accuracy and confidence scores that were quite reliable: The over-under
confidence scores yielded estimated reliabilities of r = .72 to .94 across studies, and the
accuracy scores estimates of r = .64 to .93. Our good reliability, in this instance, was a
consequence of the low correlation between self-estimates and actual ability (see the “Data
Analytic Procedures” and the Technical Supplement).
We further observe that, although DIZs and residuals require different assumptions and
different computational approaches, the two measures often converged to the same conclusion
regarding effects across our results. RSA analyses indicated that the DIZs and residual scores
both exhibited response surfaces in relation to the SEPI and TOPI as they should, but beyond
that, the RSA analyses did not converge with the rest. We further discuss the issue in the
Technical Supplement but we remain unsure of the of exact reasons. Practically speaking,
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however, our regression analyses indicate that the DIZs and residual scores may allow for
incremental predictions of key criteria.
6.2 Distinguishing people high in ability from high in confidence
6.2.1 Variables distinguishing who was overconfident
Higher self-estimates of ability using the SEPI (before correction for actual ability) correlated
substantially with a person’s general positivity, expressed variously as Extraversion,
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (reversed), Core Self-Evaluation, Perceived Support and even
Job Satisfaction.
Compared to self-estimates, Overconfidence, that is, self-estimates corrected for actual personal
intelligence, exhibited much the same pattern except that its relations with the positive-affect
measures were slightly lower than for the SEPI scores by themselves. For example, in Study 1,
simple SEPI confidence correlated r = .39 with Extraversion. Overconfidence, however,
exhibited relations of rDIZ = .24 and rresid = .38). Indeed, Overconfidence scores were slightly
less related to positive affect than simple self-estimates across studies, especially so for
residual-calculated overconfidence. Having actually-higher ability may lead to more positive
life outcomes over time, and adjusting self-estimates around actual ability ends up, in effect,
removing that contributor to feeling good. The idea that ability-adjusted scores reflect a purer
overconfidence bias, divorced from the advantages of abilities, raises the question of whether
such scores might be more closely related to narcissism, for example, than are simple selfestimates.
6.2.2. Who Is Accurate (or Not)? We also found a number of correlates with accuracy in selfestimates of personal intelligence. People who were more accurate were more conscientious,
more open to experience, and generally more intelligent—findings that mostly were consistent
across the three studies. Conscientious people may exercise greater attention in assessing their
own and others’ behavior. Open people may be more willing to acknowledge their low (or high)
skill in the area. More intelligent people may be better able to assess social and other clues as to
how well they are functioning (e.g., Sheldon, Dunning, & Ames, 2014).
6.3 Describing people who are overconfident and accurate as to their self-estimates
6.3.1 Overconfidence
Our empirical findings lead us to the following qualitative description overconfident versus
accurate groups: People who are overconfident in their personal intelligence (relative to their
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actual ability) may be somewhat unrealistically positive in their outlook, including feeling
comfortable socially, finding others agreeable (and being agreeable themselves), and calm and
emotionally stable. They generally experience high self-regard. But this pattern occurs apart
from any justification based on their actual ability. People who are underconfident are, by
comparison, introverted and less socially comfortable, more disagreeable, and tend to feel more
anxiety, depression, and anger (i.e., Neuroticism) than others—and, once again, these biases
occur after adjustment for their objective ability.
6.3.2 Accuracy
People who are most accurate at estimating their personal intelligence are higher in personal
intelligence, verbal intelligence and more open to new information than others. Such individuals
are likely to be conscientious in their outlook and behavior and perhaps therefore more attentive
to their actual abilities, placing a limit on their wishful thinking. People who are lower in their
accuracy of their own personal intelligence, by comparison, score lower on intelligence scales,
are more careless (relative to conscientious) and less open to ideas than others. In addition,
those individuals lowest in ability in all three samples most overestimated their personal
intelligence—a Dunning-Kruger effect.
6.4 Limitations of generalizability

Our findings are based on the test responses of college students in Study 1, and Englishspeaking, Mturk-using, employed individuals in Studies 2 and 3. Across the samples studied
thus far, our results concerning people who are accurate and confident appear reasonably
consistent. To be sure, further replications are in order as these represent the first findings of
this nature in relation to personal intelligence. If the current results generalize to additional
similar samples of individuals, it also remains to be seen whether such effects also appear in
cultural contexts where, for example, self-enhancement is less normative or less socially
acceptable (Hampton & Varnum, 2018).
Regarding our multiple approaches to the analyses, overconfidence and accuracy scores tended
to exhibit the same relations with criteria across studies when calculated as difference and
residual scores, but although a check with response surface analysis indicated those scores
performed as desired, a direct test with response surface analysis yielded incongruent results for
reasons unknown (see Technical Supplement for details).
A further limitation is the unknown degree to which overconfidence in one broad intelligence
such as personal intelligence relates to that in another (e.g., spatial intelligence). As indicated in
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the three-stratum Cattell-Horn-Carrol model of intelligence, all broad intelligences are related
to but partially distinct from g and from each other, and each broad intelligence makes unique
incremental predictions to specific outcomes (i.e., spatial intelligence predicts success in
architecture, Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009).
Because they are part of the “same family” of broad intelligences, we speculate that people’s
overconfidence in one broad intelligence may generalize to overconfidence in other broad
intelligences—but that is a matter for which there is little or no evidence at present. In addition,
because each broad intelligence also is (partly) unique in its relations to criteria, we maintained
throughout this treatment that overconfidence in personal intelligence might make distinct
predictions in the interpersonal domain. Whether either or both of these propositions are correct
is unknown at this time. Yet such speculation can guide future research.
6.5 Future directions
Our findings show, among other relations, that people who exhibit overconfidence are higher in
positive affect; those who are accurate are higher in conscientiousness.
Future research may explore such effects in specific domains such as occupational performance.
It may be that, on the job, team leaders who overestimate their personal intelligence claim to
possess “special insight” into others due to their abundance of enthusiasm and optimism—and
they may be good at supporting the confidence and persistence of their teams. Such
overconfident leaders, however, might jeopardize workplace performance by encouraging
unrealistic goals or by the leaders taking on roles for which they are unqualified —involving
personnel selection, for example.
The same research could further explore whether team leaders who more accurately estimate
their personal intelligence promote more realistic plans for completing their objectives—and
help their work teams to do the same. Applied research in this realm could eventually offer
useful guidance to managers and human resource professionals as to selection practices.
Returning to more general considerations, we have presented a model for the use of test scores
to identify individuals who are accurate versus inaccurate, and over-versus-underconfident in
their self-judgments of their personal intelligence. We believe such research can help us
understand more about people’s self-perceptions and how their self-perceptions influence their
relations with people more generally.
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